Probabilistic Serial Mechanism for Multi-Type Resource Allocation by Guo, Xiaoxi et al.
manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Probabilistic Serial Mechanism for Multi-Type Resource
Allocation
Xiaoxi Guo 1 · Sujoy Sikdar 2 · Haibin Wang 1 ·
Lirong Xia 3 · Yongzhi Cao 1,* · Hanpin Wang 1
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract In multi-type resource allocation (MTRA) problems, there are p ≥ 2 types of
items, and n agents, who each demand one unit of items of each type, and have strict linear
preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type.
For MTRAs with indivisible items, our first result is an impossibility theorem that is in
direct contrast to the single type (p = 1) setting: No mechanism, the output of which is al-
ways decomposable into a probability distribution over discrete assignments (where no item
is split between agents), can satisfy both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. To circumvent
this impossibility result, we consider the natural assumption of lexicographic preference,
and provide an extension of the probabilistic serial (PS), called lexicographic probabilistic
serial (LexiPS). We prove that LexiPS satisfies sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness, retaining
the desirable properties of PS. Moreover, LexiPS satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness when
agents are not allowed to misreport their importance orders.
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For MTRAs with divisible items, we show that the existing multi-type probabilistic se-
rial (MPS) mechanism satisfies the stronger efficiency notion of lexi-efficiency, and is sd-
envy-free under strict linear preferences, and sd-weak-strategyproof under lexicographic
preferences. We also prove that MPS can be characterized both by leximin-optimality and
by item-wise ordinal fairness, and the family of eating algorithms which MPS belongs to
can be characterized by no-generalized-cycle condition.
Keywords Multi-type resource allocation · Probabilistic serial · LexiPS ·MPS · Fractional
assignment · sd-efficiency · sd-envy-freeness
1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on extensions of the celebrated probabilistic serial (PS) mecha-
nism [8] for the classical resource allocation problem [2, 8, 13, 31], to the multi-type re-
source allocation problem (MTRA) [30]. An MTRA involves n agents, p≥ 2 types of items
which are not interchangeable, one unit each of n items of each type. Each agent demands
a bundle consisting of one item of each type, and has strict preferences over all bundles.
MTRAs may involve divisible items, like land and water resources [38], or computational
resources such as CPU, memory, and storage in cloud computing [18–20]. Items may also
be indivisible, where each item must be assigned fully to a single agent, like houses and
cars [40, 41], or research papers and time slots in a seminar class [30].
Efficient and fair resource allocation for a single type of items (p= 1) is well studied [1,
2, 8, 13, 26, 31, 32, 39, 47]. Our work follows the line of research initiated by Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [8], who proposed the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism. The PS mechanism
outputs a fractional assignment in multiple rounds, by having all agents simultaneously eat
shares of their favorite remaining items at a uniform and equal rate, until one of the items is
exhausted, in each round.
PS is a popular prototype for mechanism designers due to the following reasons: (i) de-
composability: PS can be applied to allocate both divisible and indivisible items, since frac-
tional assignments are always decomposable when p= 1, as guaranteed by the Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem [5, 33]. In other words, a fractional assignment can be represented as a
probability distribution over “discrete” assignments, where no item is split among agents.
(ii) efficiency and fairness: PS satisfies sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness, which are desir-
able efficiency and fairness properties respectively based on the notion of stochastic domi-
nance: Given a strict preference over the items, an allocation p stochastically dominates q,
if at every item o, the total share of o and items strictly preferred to o in p, is at least the
total share of the same items in q.
Unfortunately, designing efficient and fair mechanisms for MTRA with p ≥ 2 types is
more challenging, especially because direct applications of PS to MTRA fail to satisfy the
two desirable properties discussed above.
First, decompoability (property (i)) above relies on the decompoability of fractional as-
signments, which not always holds for MTRA as in the following simple example.
Example 1 Consider the MTRA with two agents, 1 and 2, two types of items, food (F) and
beverages (B), and two items of each type {1F ,2F}, and {1B,2B} respectively. We demon-
strate how the fractional assignment P below, where agent 1 gets 0.5 share of 1F 1B and 0.5
share of 2F 2B is not decomposable.
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Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0.5 0 0 0.5
2 0 0.5 0.5 0
Agent
P′
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1
Obviously, the assignment P′ as above is the only assignment where 1F 1B is allocated
fully to agent 1. Since agent 1 acquires 1F 1B with 0.5 shares in P, the probability for P′ ought
to be 0.5, and therefore 2F 2B should be allocated to agent 2 with 0.5 shares in P accordingly.
However, agent 2 is not allocated 2F 2B in P actually. Thus P is not decomposable.
A natural idea is to decompose MTRA into p single-type instances, one for each type
of items, and then apply PS or other mechanisms separately to each of them. Unfortunately,
this does not work because first it is unclear how to decompose agents’ combinatorial pref-
erences over bundles into separable preferences over items of the same type, and more im-
portantly, even when there is a natural way to do so, e.g. when agents’ preferences are
separable, and lexicographic, meaning that the agent has an importance order over types to
compare bundles. The following example shows that the fairness and efficiency properties
(ii) above do not hold anymore.
Example 2 We continue to use the MTRA above and assume that agents’ preferences over
{1F ,2F}×{1B,2B} are as below.
Agent Preferences
1 1F 1B 1 1F 2B 1 2F 1B 1 2F 2B
2 1F 1B 2 2F 1B 2 1F 2B 2 2F 2B
We note that both agents prefer 1F to 2F , and 1B to 2B (separable preferences). Agent 1
considers F to be more important than B, while agent 2 considers B to be more important. In
this way we can decompose this MTRA into two single type resource allocation problems
for F and B respectively. It is easy to see that for each single type the only sd-efficient and
sd-envy-free assignment is to give both agents 0.5 shares of each item, yielding the decom-
posable fractional assignment Q by the mutually independence of each type. However, Q is
inefficient, as Q′ stochastically dominates Q from both agents’ perspectives:
Agent
Q
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Agent
Q′
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0.25 0.5 0 0.25
2 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
As we have observed, the two desirable properties of PS for single type resource al-
location no longer obviously hold for MTRAs. Recently, Wang et al. [43] proposed multi-
type probabilistic serial (MPS) mechanism as an extension of PS for MTRAs with divisible
items, and proved that MPS is sd-efficient for general partial preference, sd-envy-free for
CP-net preferences [11], and sd-weak-strategyproof for CP-net preferences with the shared
dependency graph. However, it is unclear whether MPS can be applied to the allocation of
indivisible items because the outcome may not be decomposable. This leaves the following
natural open question:
How to design efficient and fair mechanisms for MTRAs with indivisible and divisible
items? 1
1 Note that for indivisible items, the (fractional) output of a mechanism must be decomposable.
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Our Contributions. For MTRAs with indivisible items, unfortunately, our impossibility
theorem (Theorem 1) shows that no mechanism which satisfies sd-efficiency and sd-envy-
freeness is guaranteed to always output decomposable assignments, if agents’ preferences
are allowed to be any linear orders over bundles. Fortunately, when agents’ preferences are
lexicographic, the impossibility theorem can be circumvented. To this end, we propose lexi-
cographic probabilistic serial mechanism (LexiPS) and prove that it satisfies many desirable
properties of PS: it is guaranteed to output a decomposable assignment, satisfy sd-efficiency
and sd-envy-freeness (Theorem 2), and satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness, when agents
do not lie about their importance orders over types (Theorem 3).
For MTRAs with divisible items, we show that when agents’ preferences are linear or-
ders over all bundles of items, the MPS mechanism proposed by Wang et al. [43] satisfies
lexi-efficiency (Theorem 4) which is a stronger notion of efficiency than sd-efficiency. In-
deed, we show that lexi-efficiency implies the no-generalized-cycle condition, which is a
sufficient condition for sd-efficiency (similarly to Wang et al. [43]), but not a necessary
one (Proposition 1).We also prove that every assignment satisfying no-generalized-cycle
can be computed by some algorithm in the family of eating algorithms (Theorem 5), of
which MPS is a member. Importantly, MPS retains sd-envy-freeness (Proposition 2), and
when agents’ preferences are further assumed to be lexicographic, MPS satisfies sd-weak-
strategyproofness (Theorem 6). Finally, we characterize MPS by leximin-optimality and
item-wise ordinal fairness, respectively (Theorem 7). However, the output of MPS is not
always decomposable (Remark 4) even under lexicographic preference, making it unsuit-
able for MTRAs with indivisible items.
Related Work and Discussions. Our paper provides the first results on designing efficient
and fair mechanisms for MTRAs with indivisible items, to the best of our knowledge. De-
spite our impossibility theorem (Theorem 1), our LexiPS mechanism and its properties
deliver the following positive message: it is possible to design efficient and fair mechanism
for indivisible items under the natural domain restriction of lexicographic preferences.
Our results on properties of MPS are complementary, and not directly comparable, to the
results by Wang et al. [43] because we assume that agents’ preferences are linear orders over
bundles of items, whereas Wang et al. [43] assumed partial orders. In particular, we prove
that MPS satisfies lexi-efficiency which is a stronger notion that sd-efficiency for the unre-
stricted domain of linear orders, and we prove that MPS satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness
when agents’ preferences are lexicographic (w.r.t. possibly different importance orders). In
contrast, Wang et al. [43] prove that MPS satisfies sd-efficiency for the unrestricted domain
of partial orders, and satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness when agents’ preferences are CP-
nets with a common dependency structure.
MTRAs was first introduced and discussed by Moulin [31], and was recently explic-
itly formulated in the form presented in this paper by Mackin and Xia [30], who provided
a characterization of serial dictatorships satisfying strategyproofness, neutrality, and non-
bossiness for MTRAs. In a similar vein, Sikdar et al. [40, 41] considered multi-type housing
markets [31]. A related problem setting is one where agents may demand multiple units of
items. Hatfield [23] considered that agents have multi-unit demands, but their setting has a
different combinatorial structure to ours’. Fujita et al. [16] considered the exchange econ-
omy with multi-unit consumption. However, in each of these works, items are never shared,
and agents must be assigned a whole bundle. The work by Ghodsi et al. [18] is an exception,
as they consider the problem of allocating multiple types of divisible resources by shares, but
is not comparable to ours because resources of the same type are indistinguishable in their
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setting. MTRAs with divisible items may also be viewed as a version of the cake-cutting
problem [12, 14, 15, 34, 35, 42], with p cakes, and agents having ordinal preferences over
combinations of pieces from each cake.
The lexicographic preference is a natural restriction on preference domain in resource
allocation [16, 40, 41], and combinatorial voting [10, 29, 44]. Saban and Sethuraman [37]
showed that PS is efficient, envy-free, and strategy-proof under lexicographic preference on
allocations. Fujita et al. [16] considered the allocation problem which allows agents to re-
ceive multiple items and agents rank the groups of items lexicographically. Our work follows
in this research agenda of natural domain restrictions on agents’ preferences to circumvent
impossibility results in guaranteeing efficiency and fairness.
MTRAs belongs to a more general line of research on mechanism design known as
multi-agent resource allocation (see Chevaleyre et al. [13] for a survey), where literature
focuses on the problem where items are of a single type. Early research focused mainly on
developing “discrete” mechanisms for indivisible items, where each item is assigned fully to
a single agent [2, 17, 28, 36, 39]. However, discrete mechanisms often fail to simultaneously
satisfy efficiency and fairness.
Fractional mechanisms simultaneously provide stronger efficiency and fairness guar-
antees. For example, the random priority (RP) mechanism [1] outputs fractional assign-
ments, and satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-weak-envy-freeness, and sd-strategyproofness.
Such fractional mechanisms can be applied to both divisible and indivisible items in the
single type setting (p = 1), due to the Birkhoff-Von Neumann theorem which implies that
every fractional assignment is decomposable.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] proposed the PS mechanism, a fractional mechanism sat-
isfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and sd-weak-strategyproofness. PS uniquely pos-
sesses the important properties of sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness with the restriction of
bounded invariance [6, 7], and is the only mechanism satisfying ordinal fairness and non-
wastefulness [22]. Besides, Bogomolnaia [6] characterized PS with leximin maximizing
the vector describing cumulative shares at each item [4, 9], which reflects that PS is egali-
tarian in attempting to equalize agents shares of their top ranked choices. The remarkable
properties of PS has encouraged several extensions: to the full preference domain, allow-
ing indifferences [25, 27], to multi-unit demands [24], and to housing markets [3, 45]. In
the settings above, PS usually only retains some of its original properties and loses state-
gyproofness [3, 24, 27, 46].
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de-
fine the MTRA problem, and provide definitions of desirable efficiency and fairness proper-
ties. Section 3 is the impossibility result for MTRAs with indivisible items. In Section 4, we
propose LexiPS for MTRAs with indivisible items under lexicographic preferences, which
satisfies sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness, and it is sd-weak-strategyproof when agents do
not lie about importance orders. In Section 5, we show the properties of MPS for MTRAs
with divisible items under linear preferences, and provide two characterizations for MPS.
In Section 6, we summarize the contributions of our paper, and discuss directions for future
work.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the set of agents, and M = D1∪·· ·∪Dp be the set of items. For each
i≤ p, Di is a set of n items of type i, and for all iˆ 6= i, we have Di∩Diˆ = /0. There is one unit
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of supply of each item in M. We use D = D1×·· ·×Dp to denote the set of bundles. Each
bundle x ∈D is a p-vector and each component refers to an item of each type. We use o ∈ x
to indicate that bundle x contains item o. In an MTRA, each agent demands, and is allocated
one unit of item of each type.
A preference profile is denoted by R = ( j) j≤n, where  j represents agent j’s prefer-
ence as a strict linear preference, i.e. the strict linear order over D . Let R be the set of all
possible preference profiles.
A fractional allocation is a |D |-vector, describing the fractional share of each bundle
allocated to an agent. Let Π be the set of all the possible fractional allocations. For any
p ∈ Π , x ∈ D , we use px to denote the share of x assigned by p. A fractional assignment
is a n× |D |-matrix P = [p j,x] j≤n,x∈D , where (i) for each j ≤ n,x ∈ D , p j,x ∈ [0,1] is the
fractional share of x allocated to agent j, (ii) for every j ≤ n, ∑x∈D p j,x = 1, fulfilling the
demand of each agent, (iii) for every o ∈M, So = {x : x ∈D and o ∈ x}, ∑ j≤n,x∈So p j,x = 1,
respecting the unit supply of each item. For each j≤ n, row j of P, denoted by Pj represents
agent j’s fractional allocation under P. We useP to denote the set of all possible fractional
assignments. A discrete assignment A, is an assignment where each agent is assigned a unit
share of a bundle, and each item is fully allocated to some agent2. It follows that a discrete
assignment is represented by a matrix where each element is either 0 or 1. We use A to
denote the set of all discrete assignment matrices.
A mechanism f is a mapping from preference profiles to fractional assignments. For any
profile R ∈ R, we use f (R) to refer to the fractional assignment output by f , and for any
agent j ≤ n and any bundle x ∈ D , f (R) j,x refers to the value of the element of the matrix
indexed by j and x.
2.1 Desirable Properties
We use the notion of stochastic dominance to compare fractional assignments, and define
desired notions of efficiency and fairness in the MTRA setting from Wang et al. [43].
Definition 1 (stochastic dominance [43]) Given a preference  over D , the stochastic
dominance relation associated with , denoted sd , is a partial ordering over Π such that
for any pair of fractional allocations p,q ∈Π , p weakly stochastically dominates q, denoted
p sd q, if and only if for every x ∈D , ∑xˆ∈U(,x) pxˆ ≥ ∑xˆ∈U(,x) qxˆ, where U(,x) = {xˆ :
xˆ x}∪{x}.
The stochastic dominance order can also be extended to fractional assignments. For
P,Q ∈P, j ≤ n, we assume that agent j only cares about her own allocations Pj,Q j. If
Pj sdj Q j, it will weakly prefer P to Q, i.e. P sdj Q. Therefore we say that P weakly
stochastically dominates Q, denoted P sd Q, if P sdj Q for any j ≤ n. It is easy to prove
that P sdj Q,Q sdj P if and only if Pj = Q j.
Definition 2 (sd-efficiency [43]) Given an MTRA (N,M,R), a fractional assignment P is
sd-efficient if there is no other fractional assignment Q 6= P such that Q sdj P for every
j ≤ n. Correspondingly, if for every R ∈R, f (R) is sd-efficient, then mechanism f satisfies
sd-efficiency.
2 For for indivisible items, discrete assignments refer to deterministic assignments in the papers about
randomization.
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Definition 3 (sd-envy-freeness [43]) Given an MTRA (N,M,R), a fractional assignment P
is sd-envy-free if for every pair of agents j, jˆ ≤ n, Pj sdj Pjˆ. Correspondingly, if for every
R ∈R, f (R) is sd-envy-free, then mechanism f satisfies sd-envy-freeness.
Definition 4 (sd-weak-strategyproofness [43]) Given an MTRA (N,M,R), a mechanism
f satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness if for every profile R ∈ R, every agent j ≤ n, every
R′ ∈R such that R′ = (′j,− j), where − j is the preferences of agents in the set N \{ j},
it holds that:
f (R′) sdj f (R) =⇒ f (R′) j = f (R) j.
Besides stochastic dominance, we introduce the lexicographic dominance relation to
compare pairs of fractional allocations, by comparing the components of their respective
vector representations one by one according to the agent’s preference.
Definition 5 (lexicographic dominance) Given a preference , and a pair of allocations p
and q, p lexicographically dominates q, denoted plexi q, if and only if there exist a bundle
x such that px > qx, and for each xˆ x, pxˆ ≥ qxˆ.
Just like stochastic dominance, given assignments P and Q, we say Qlexi P if Q j lexij
Pj (Q lexij P for short) for every agent j. Note that stochastic dominance implies lexico-
graphic dominance, but lexicographic dominance does not imply stochastic dominance.
Definition 6 (lexi-efficiency) Given a preference profile R, the fractional assignment P is
lexi-efficient if there is no Q∈P s.t. Qlexi P. A fractional assignment algorithm f satisfies
lexi-efficiency if f (R) is lexi-efficient for every R ∈R.
Leximin-optimality requires that the output of a mechanism leximin maximizes the vec-
tor describing cumulative shares at each item [4, 9], which reflects the egalitarian nature of
the mechenism in attempting to equalize agents shares of their top ranked choices.
Definition 7 (leximin-optimality) For any vector u of length k, let u∗ = (u∗1,u
∗
2, . . . ,u
∗
k), be
its transformation into the k-vector of u’s components sorted in ascending order. Let L be
the leximin relation, where for any two vectors u,v, we say (u,v) ∈ L, if u∗ lexi v∗. For
any fractional assignment P, let uP = (uPj,x) j≤n,x∈D , where for each agent j ≤ n, and bundle
x∈D , uPj,x =∑xˆ∈U( j ,x) p j,xˆ. A fractional assignment P is leximin-optimal, if for every other
assignment Q, (uP,uQ) ∈ L.
Item-wise ordinal fairness involves the comparison of the cumulative share. In contrast
to sd-envy-freeness, the upper contour sets in item-wise ordinal fairness depend on the dif-
ferent preferences, and the bundles to determine the sets only need to share a certain item.
Definition 8 (item-wise ordinal fairness) The fractional assignment P which is item-wise
ordinal fair satisfies that: For any x with positive shares for agent j s.t. p j,x > 0, there
exists o ∈ x such that for any xˆ containing o and an arbitrary agent k, if pk,xˆ > 0, then
∑x′∈U(k ,xˆ) pk,x′ ≤∑x′∈U( j ,x) p j,x′ . A fractional assignment algorithm f satisfies item-wise
ordinal fairness if f (R) is item-wise ordinal fair for every R ∈R.
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3 Efficiency and Fairness for MTRAs with Indivisible Items
In this section, we show an impossibility result in Theorem 1 that no mechanism satisfying
sd-envy-freeness and sd-efficiency is guaranteed to output decomposable assignments. This
is unlike the case of resource allocation problems with a single type of items, where by the
Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, every fractional assignment is decomposable, i.e. every
fractional assignment can be decomposed like
P = ∑
Ak∈A
αk×Ak.
Here each Ak is a discrete assignment that assigns every item wholly to some agent. Observe
that ∑αk = 1. It follows that such a decomposable assignment can be applied to allocating
indivisible items, by issuing a lottery for Ak, and αk is its probability being selected among
all the discrete assignments. It is not necessarily so in MTRAs, which leads to the impossi-
bility result.
Theorem 1 For any MTRAs with p ≥ 2, where agents are allowed to submit any linear
order over bundles, no mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness always
outputs decomposable assignments.
Proof Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a mechanism f satisfying sd-
efficiency and sd-envy-freeness and f (R) is always decomposable for any R ∈R. Let R be
the following preference and Q = f (R).
Agent Preferences
1 1F 1B 1 1F 2B 1 2F 2B 1 2F 1B
2 1F 2B 2 2F 1B 2 1F 1B 2 2F 2B
We show that if Q is sd-envy-free and decomposable, it fails to satisfy sd-efficiency.
There are only four discrete assignments which assign 1F 1B,1F 2B,2F 1B,2F 2B to agent 1
respectively. Since Q is decomposable, it can be represented as the following assignment.
We also provide an assignment P which is not decomposable since it does not satisfy the
constraints for Q.
Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0.5 0 0 0.5
2 0 0.5 0.5 0
Agent
Q
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 v w y z
2 z y w v
Here v,w,y,z are probabilities of these four discrete assignments and there exists v+w+
y+ z = 1. Due to sd-envy-freeness, we have following inequalities in terms of agent 1: It is
easy to see that ∑x∈U(1,2F 1B) q1,x = 1 = ∑x∈U(1,2F 1B) q2,x. In addition,
∑
x∈U(1,1F 1B)
q1,x =v≥ z = ∑
x∈U(1,1F 1B))
q2,x
∑
x∈U(1,1F 2B)
q1,x =v+w≥ z+ y = ∑
x∈U(1,1F 2B)
q2,x
∑
x∈U(1,2F 2B)
q1,x =v+w+ z≥ z+ y+ v = ∑
x∈U(1,2F 2B)
q2,x
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Similarly, for agent 2, there exists y ≥ w,y+w+ z ≥ w+ y+ v. Thus w = y,v = z,v+w =
y+ z = 0.5. Because Q is sd-efficient, P 6sd Q. Suppose that P 6sd1 Q. Therefore at least
one of the following inequalities is true:
∑
x∈U(1,1F 1B)
q1,x =v > 0.5 = ∑
x∈U(1,1F 1B)
p1,x
∑
x∈U(1,1F 2B)
q1,x =v+w > 0.5 = ∑
x∈U(1,1F 2B)
p1,x
∑
x∈U(1,2F 2B)
q1,x =v+w+ z > 1 = ∑
x∈U(1,2F 2B)
p1,x
∑
x∈U(1,2F 1B)
q1,x =v+w+ z+ y > 1 = ∑
x∈U(1,2F 1B)
p1,x
(1)
Since v = z ≤ v+w = y+ z = 0.5, all inequalities in (1) do not hold. Thus we have P sd1
Q. With a similar analysis, we can also obtain that P sd2 Q. Therefore we have that P sd
Q and P 6= Q, which is contradictory to the assumption. uunionsq
Remark 1 Theorem 1 can be tightened under LP-tree preferences [10, 41] contained in the
strict linear preferences, with sd-weak-efficiency [7, 21] implied by sd-efficiency, and sd-
weak-envy-freeness [8] implied by sd-envy-freeness.
An LP-tree preference profile is that each agent’s preference can be represented as a
rooted directed tree with each node labeled by type and a conditional preference table. In
each path from root to a leaf, every type occurs only once. For a node labeled by type t, its
conditional preference table is a strict linear order over items in Dt , and each edge from it
is labeled by each of these items. The sd-weak-efficiency only concerns that any two agents
cannot improve their allocations by exchanging shares between them. The sd-weak-envy-
freeness requires that for any agent, the other agents’ allocations are not better than hers.
Here we give the brief definition of these two properties, and the proof of the tighter result
is in Appendix A.1.
sd-weak-efficiency: The mechanism f satisfies sd-weak-efficiency if for any R ∈ R,
there is no fractional assignment P 6= f (R) such that P sdj f (R) for every j ≤ n and
|{ j ∈ N : Pj 6= f (R) j}| ≤ 2.
sd-weak-envy-freeness: The mechanism f satisfies sd-weak-envy-freeness if for every
pair of agents j, jˆ ≤ n,Pjˆ sdj Pj⇒ Pjˆ = Pj.
We give the proof in Appendix A.1.
4 MTRAs with Indivisible Items and Lexicographic Preferences
In this section, we first introduce the lexicographic preference, and then develop LexiPS
as a specialized mechanism for MTRAs where the items are indivisible and agents’ pref-
erences are restricted to the lexicographic preference domain, and show that it retains the
good properties of PS.
Faced with the impossibility result of Theorem 1 we wonder if it is possible to circum-
vent it by adding some reasonable restriction. We finally choose lexicographic preferences
as a restriction on the preference domain in our setting according to the result in Remark 1.
An agent with a lexicographic preference compares two bundles by comparing the items
of each type in the two bundles one by one according to the importance order on types. In
short, the agent takes the importance of types into consideration while ranking bundles. We
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say that a certain MTRA is under the restriction of lexicographic preferences if it satisfies
that for every agent j ≤ n,  j is a lexicographic preference. We give its formal definition in
the following with the notation Di(x): Given any bundle x ∈ D and any type i ≤ p, Di(x)
refers to the item of type i in x.
Definition 9 (lexicographic preference) Given an MTRA, the preference relation  j of
agent j ≤ n is lexicographic if there exists (i) importance order i.e. a strict linear order B j
over p types, (ii) for each type i ≤ p, a strict linear order ij over Di, such that for every
pair x, xˆ ∈D , x j xˆ if and only if there exists a type i s.t. Di(x)ij Di(xˆ), and for all iˆB j i,
Diˆ(x) = Diˆ(xˆ).
For example, the preference 1F 2B  1F 1B  2F 2B  2F 1B is a lexicographic preference
represented as importance order F B B, and strict linear orders 1F F 2F and 2B B 1B for
two types. We also note that although lexicographic preference and lexicographic dominance
looks similar, lexicographic preference is used in ranking bundles in agents’ preferences,
while lexicographic dominance is used to compare allocations or assignments consisting of
shares of bundles.
4.1 Algorithm for LexiPS
Before going any further with LexiPS, we introduce some notations for ease of exposition.
We use Pi to denote the fractional assignment of items of type i at P. Pi is a |N|×|Di|matrix
and for any i ≤ p, any o ∈ Di, pij,o = ∑o∈x,x∈D pi,x represents the total share of bundles
containing o consumed by agent j. To distinguish from single type fractional assignments,
we call the ones for MTRAs as multi-type fractional assignments. Besides, for o ∈ Di, we
use the notation of the upper contour set U(i,o) to refer to items of type i that better or
equal to o regarding i.
Algorithm 1 LexiPS
1: Input: An MTRA (N,M), a lexicographic preference profile R.
2: For every o ∈M, supply(o)← 1. For every i≤ n, Pi← 0n×n. P← 0n×|D |.
3: loop p times
4: Identify top type i j for every agent j ≤ n.
//For the kth loop, i j is the kth type regarding B j .
5: for i≤ p do
6: t← 0.
7: Ni = { j ≤ n|i j = i}.
8: while t < 1 do
9: Identify top item topi( j) in type i for every agent j ∈ Ni.
10: Consume.
10.1: For each o ∈ Di,consumers(o)← |{ j ∈ Ni : topi( j) = o}|.
10.2: ρ ←mino∈Di supply(o)consumers(o) .
10.3: For each j ∈ N0, pij,topi( j)← pij,topi( j)+ρ .
10.4: For each o ∈ Di, supply(o)← supply(o)−ρ × consumers(o).
10.5: t← t+ρ .
11: For every j ≤ n,x ∈D ,p j,x =∏o=Di(x),i≤p pij,o.
12: return P
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In the LexiPS mechanism, agent j always consumes her favorite item o j available in
the current most important type. Agent j would not stop consuming o j unless one of the
following occurs:
(i) o j is exhausted, and then agent j will consume her next favorite and available item
according to ij;
(ii) ∑o∈Di p
i
j,o = 1,o j ∈ Di, and then agent j will turn to her next most important type
iˆ according to B j and consume her favorite item available in that type.
After consumption, we obtain Pi for every type i ≤ p. With the assumption that alloca-
tions among different types are independent, we construct P by
p j,x = ∏
o=Di(x),i≤p
pij,o. (2)
We divide the execution of LexiPS into p phase where each agent only consume items
in her current most important type i j, and the time t for each phase is up to one unit. In the
beginning of each phase, we set the timer t = 0. During the consumption, agent j first decides
her most preferred unexhausted item topi( j) in her current most importance type i regarding
ij. Here we say an item o is exhausted if the supply supply(o) = 0. Each agent consumes
the item at a uniform rate of one unit per unit of time. The consumption pauses whenever
one of the items being consumed becomes exhausted. That means agent j’s share on topi( j)
is increased by ρ , the duration since last pause, and the supply supply(o) is computed by
subtracting ρ for consumers(o) times, the number of agent j which satisfies topi( j) = o. In
Algorithm 1, ρ is computed by mino∈M supply(o)consumers(o) . After that we increase the timer t by ρ ,
identify topi( j) for each agent, and continue the consumption. The current phase ends when
the timer t reaches 1, and the algorithm starts the next phase. We show that LexiPS is able
to deal with indivisible items while retaining the good properties in Theorem 2.
Fig. 1 Execution of LexiPS in Example 3.
Example 3 Consider an MTRA where N = {1,2,3}, M = DF ×DB,DF = {1F ,2F ,3F},
DB = {1B,2B,3B}, and the profile R = {1,2,3}. The preferences 1,2,3 are as
follows:
Agent Preferences
1 F B1 B,1F F1 2F F1 3F ,1B B1 2B B1 3B
2 F B2 B,1F F2 2F F2 3F ,1B B2 3B B2 2B
3 BB3 F,1F F3 2F F3 3F ,2B B3 3B B3 1B
The execution of LexiPS is shown in Fig. 1. In loop 1, agent 1 and 2 consume items in DF ,
while agent 3 consumes alone in DB. Therefore agent 3 gets her favorite items 2B in DB
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fully, and 1B and 3B are left. Since agent 1 and 2 have the same preference for DF , they each
obtain 0.5 units of 1F and 0.5 units of 2F , and 3F is left. Similarly in loop 2, agent 1 and 2
prefers type B while agent 3 prefers F . Then agent 3 gets the remaining item 3F , and agent
1 and 2 divide 1B and 3B uniformly according to their preferences.
Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 3B 2F 1B 2F 3B 3F 2B
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0
3 0 0 0 0 1
The consumption above results in the final assignment P, and it is easy to check that P is
decomposable.
4.2 Properties
Theorem 2 shows that, as an extension of PS, LexiPS inherits efficiency and envyfreeness
based on stochastic dominance in solving MTRAs with lexicographic preferences, and it is
able to deal with indivisible items for its decomposable outputs.
Theorem 2 For MTRAs with lexicographic preferences, LexiPS satisfies sd-efficiency and
sd-envy-freeness. Especially, LexiPS outputs decomposable assignments.
Proof Given a MTRA(N,M), and profile R of lexicographic preferences, let P= LexiPS(R).
In the following proof, we use oi to refer to an arbitrary item of type i, and (oi∗) to refer to
any bundle containing oi.
(1) (sd-efficiency) By contradiction, we suppose in another assignment Q there exists
agent j who get a better allocation than in P when others are also better or not affected,
which means Q sd P. W.l.o.g, label the type according to B j as 1 B j 2 B j . . . B j p. We
show that Q j = Pj by proving the following equation with mathematical induction: for any
i≤ p and any o1, . . . ,oi,
∑
x=(o1,...,oi∗)
p j,x = ∑
x=(o1,...,oi∗)
q j,x. (3)
First, we prove (3) when i = 1 i.e. Q1j = P
1
j . If Q
1 sdj P1 is false, we have that there
exists oˆ1 and the least preferred bundle xˆ containing oˆ1 regarding  j such that
∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
p j,x = ∑
o∈U(1j ,oˆ1)
p j,o > ∑
o∈U(1j ,oˆ1)
q j,o = ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
q j,x.
That is a contradiction to the assumption Q sdj P. Therefore we suppose Q1 sdj P1 and
Q1j 6= P1j . In some way, we say P1 can be improved to Q1 by shares transferring of bundles.
Let N1 denote the set of agents who consume items of type 1 in Phase 1. Let oˆ1 be the least
preferred item agent j gets in P1 according to 1j . From Algorithm 1, we learn that agents
in N1 obey the rule of PS in Phase 1, and therefore the partial assignment for them P1N1 =
(P1j ) j∈N1 is sd-efficient. Besides, agents not in N1 only gets bundles x with D1(x) not better
than oˆ1. By assumption there exists o1 such that p1j,o1 < q
1
j,o1 and ∑o1j o1 p
1
j,o = ∑o1j o1 q
1
j,o,
and therefore we have that the share transferring:
(i) only involves agents in N1, which is a contradiction of sd-efficiency of P1N1 ;
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(ii) involves agents not in N1 and the best items of type 1 w.r.t. 1j they may have
is oˆ1. If o1 6= oˆ1, the extra share of q1j,o1 comes from agents in N1, which is a con-
tradiction of sd-efficiency as in Case (i). Therefore o1 = oˆ1 and we have ∑o∈D1 q
1
j,o =
∑o∈U(1j ,o1) q
1
j,o > ∑o∈U(1j ,o1) p
1
j,o = ∑o∈D1 p
1
j,o = 1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore we have Q1j = P
1
j .
Then we prove (3) for type i > 1 while for any o1, . . . ,oi−1,
∑
x=(o1,...,oi−1∗)
p j,x = ∑
x=(o1,...,oi−1∗)
q j,x. (4)
It is easy to see that here (3) is equivalent to Qi = Pi. We first show that like in type 1 it is
necessary that Qi sdj Pi. For any oˆ1, . . . , oˆi, let xˆ be the least preferred bundle containing
them regarding  j. Let
Di ={(oˆ1, . . . , oˆi−1,oi∗)|oi ∈U(ij, oˆi)},
D ′i ={(o1, . . . ,oi−1∗)|o1 ∈U(1j , oˆ1), . . . ,oi−2 ∈U(i−2j , oˆi−2),oi−1 i−1j oˆi−1}.
By assumption Q sdj P we have that
∑
x∈Di
p j,x+ ∑
x∈D ′i
p j,x = ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
p j,x ≤ ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
q j,x = ∑
x∈Di
q j,x+ ∑
x∈D ′i
q j,x (5)
With (4) we have ∑x∈D ′i p j,x = ∑x∈D ′i q j,x, and induce from (5) that ∑x∈Di p j,x ≤ ∑x∈Di q j,x.
By summing up each side by oˆ1, . . . , oˆi−1, we have that:
∑ˆ
o1
· · · ∑ˆ
oi−1
∑
x∈Di
p j,x ≤ ∑ˆ
o1
· · · ∑ˆ
oi−1
∑
x∈Di
q j,x.
According to the definition of lexicographic preference, it is equal to:
∑
x∈{(oi∗)|oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)}
p j,x ≤ ∑
x∈{(oi∗)|oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)}
q j,x.
It can also be written as:
∑
oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)
pij,oi ≤ ∑
oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)
qij,oi
That means Qi sdj Pi.
With Qi sdj Pi, next we prove Qi 6= Pi is false by contradiction as for type i. Let
Ni denote the set of agents who consume items of type i in Phase i and N′i denote agents
consume items of type i after Phase i. Notice that agents which have obtained items of type
i before Phase i are not considered because they can never benefit by trading shares with
agents in Ni
⋃
N′i . Let oˆi be the least preferred item agent j gets in Pi according toij. As we
have shown in the proof for type 1, PiNi = (P
i
j) j∈Ni , the partial assignment for agents in Ni,
is sd-efficient regarding the available items of type i in Phase i, and agents in N′i only gets
bundles x with Di(x) not better than oˆi. By assumption there exists oi such that pij,oi < q
i
j,oi
and ∑oijoi p
i
j,o = ∑oijoi q
i
j,o, and therefore we have that the share transferring:
(i’) only involves agents in Ni, which is a contradiction of sd-efficiency of PiNi ;
14 Xiaoxi Guo et al.
(ii’) involves agents in N′i , and the best items of type i w.r.t. ij they may have is oˆi. If
oi 6= oˆi, the extra share of qij,oi comes from agents in Ni, which is a contradiction of sd-
efficiency as in Case (i’). Therefore oi = oˆi and we have ∑o∈Di q
i
j,o = ∑o∈U(ij ,oi) p
i
j,o >
∑o∈U(ij ,oi) q
i
j,o = ∑o∈Di q
i
j,o = 1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore we have the result.
By mathematical induction, we have that p j,x = q j,x, which is a contradiction to Q j 6=Pj.
(2) (sd-envy-freeness) As agents spend one unit of time for each type, we divide the
execution of LexiPS into p phases by type, and the following proof develops by phases.
We first declare that agent j does not envy other agents who have the same importance
order. For convenience, we label the types according to B j. Let Ni be the set of agents who
consume items of types i in Phase i. Phase i can be viewed as the execution of PS for the
single type allocation problem with agents in Ni and available items left in Di at Phase i.
By [8], we know that PS satisfies sd-envy-freeness. Therefore we have that for any k ∈
Ni, ∑o′∈U(ij ,o) p
i
j,o′ ≥ ∑o′∈U(ij ,o) p
i
k,o′ for any o ∈ Di, which also means ∑x′∈U( j ,x) p j,x′ ≥
∑x′∈U( j ,x) pk,x′ for any x ∈D .
We next declare that agent j does not envy agents who have different important orders.
Assume by contradiction that k is such an agent and there exists xˆ ∈D which satisfies
∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
p j,x < ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
pk,x. (6)
We prove the declaration by mathematical induction. First we prove agent k’s most important
type is 1. If not, then agent k would consume o ∈ D1 in the later phase. However, the items
left in D1 at phase i 6= 1 are not more preferable than those consumed by agent j. Thus for
any oˆ1,o1 satisfying p1j,oˆ1 > 0, p
1
k,o1
> 0, we have oˆ1 1i o1 or oˆ1 = o1. We discuss them
respectively.
Case (i): If oˆ1 1j o1 for any oˆ1, oˆ1 satisfying p1j,o1 > 0, p1k,o1 > 0. then we obtain that for
any xˆ,x, p j,xˆ > 0, pk,x > 0, we have xˆ  j x since D1(xˆ)1j D1(x). Let xˆ be least preferable
bundle according to  j and p j,xˆ > 0, and we have that for any x′ ∈U( j, xˆ),
∑
x∈U( j ,x′)
p j,x ≥ ∑
x∈U( j ,x′)
pk,x = 0 (7)
For any x′ which satisfies xˆ j x′,
∑
x∈U( j ,x′)
p j,x = 1≥ ∑
x∈U( j ,x′)
pk,x (8)
Combining (7) and (8), we obtain that ∑x∈U( j ,x′) p j,x ≥ ∑x∈U( j ,x′) pk,x for any x′, a con-
tradiction to (6).
Case (ii): If there exists oˆ1 satisfying p1j,oˆ1 > 0, p
1
k,oˆ1
> 0, then oˆ1 will be the least prefer-
able item consumed by agent j, and the most preferable one consumed by agent k both
regarding 1j . We obtain that
∑
o1j oˆ1
p1j,o1 = 1− p1j,oˆ1 ≥ p1k,oˆ1 = ∑
o∈U(1j ,oˆ1)
p1k,o1 . (9)
It means that for every xˆ = (oˆ1∗),
∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
p j,x ≥ ∑
o1j oˆ1
p1j,o ≥ ∑
o∈U(1j ,oˆ1)
p1k,o ≥ ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
pk,x
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When xˆ 6= (oˆ1∗), we have (7) for D1(xˆ) 1j o1 and (8) for o1 ij D1(xˆ), which cover the
remaining cases. Therefore agent k’s first important type is 1.
Then we prove the agent k’s ith important type is i when her i′th type is iˆ for i′ < i,
i.e. pi
′
j,oi′
= pi
′
k,oi′
for i′ < i. Suppose it is false and we discuss by cases above as for type
1.Because agent k consumes items in type i later that agent j, we note that for any oi, oˆi
satisfying pij,oi > 0, p
i
k,oˆi
> 0, we have oi ij oˆi or oi = oˆi.
Case (i’): Suppose for any oi, oˆi satisfying pij,oi > 0, p
i
k,oˆi
> 0 and oi 6= oˆi, we have oi ij
oˆi. That means for x= (o1, . . . ,oi−1,oi∗), xˆ= (o1, . . . ,oi−1, oˆi∗) satisfying p j,x > 0, pk,xˆ > 0,
we have that x j xˆ. For any o′1, . . . ,o′i, let x′ = (o′1, . . . ,o′i∗). Then we can obtain the result
similar to (7) and (8) in Case (i) regarding (2), the computation way of bundle shares in
LexiPS:
∑
x=(o′1,...,o′i−1∗),x∈U( j ,x′)
p j,x ≥ ∑
x=(o′1,...,o′i−1∗),x∈U( j ,x′)
pk,x (10)
In addition, we can take the cumulative shares of upper contour set apart as follows:
∑
x∈U( j ,x′)
p j,x = ∑
x∈{(o1∗)|o11j o′1}
p j,x+ ∑
x∈{(o′1,o2∗)|o22j o′2}
p j,x
+ · · ·+ ∑
x=(o′1,...,o′i−1∗),x∈U( j ,x′)
p j,x
(11)
By the computation of shares for bundles (2) and for any iˆ < i, piˆj,oiˆ = p
iˆ
k,oiˆ
, we have that
∑
x∈{(o′1,...,oiˆ∗)|oiˆiˆjo′ˆi}
p j,x = ∑
x∈{(o′1,...,oiˆ∗)|oiˆiˆjo′ˆi}
pk,x (12)
Therefore with (10), (11) and (12) we have ∑x∈U( j ,x′) p j,x ≥ ∑x∈U( j ,x′) pk,x for any x′, a
contradiction to (6).
Case (ii’): Suppose there exists oˆi satisfying pij,oˆi > 0, p
i
k,oˆi
> 0. Therefore oˆi will be the
least preferable item consumed by agent j, and the most preferable one consumed by agent
k both regardingij. Let x′ = (o′1, . . . ,o′i−1,o′i∗). We first consider o′i = oˆi. Similar to (9), we
have that
∑
oij oˆi
pij,o = 1− pij,oˆi ≥ pik,oˆi = ∑
o∈U(ij ,oˆi)
pik,o (13)
With computation way of bundle shares (2), we induce that for α =∏i−1i′=1 p
i
j,o′
i′
=∏i−1i′=1 p
i
k,o′
i′
,
∑
x=(o′1,...,o′i−1∗),x∈U( j ,x′)
p j,x
≥α× ∑
oij oˆi
pij,o ≥ α× ∑
o∈U(ij ,oˆi)
pik,o
≥ ∑
x=(o′1,...,o′i−1∗),x∈U( j ,x′)
pk,x.
(14)
With (11) and (12), (14) means ∑x∈U( j ,x′) p j,x ≥ ∑x∈U( j ,x′) pk,x. When o′i 6= oˆi, we have
(10) for x′, and we can obtain the same results as in Case (i’). Therefore agent k’s first
important type is i.
Therefore agent k’s important order is the same as agent j’s, which is a contradiction.
With the results above, we prove that agent j envies nobody.
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(3) (decomposable outputs) By the classical Birkhoff-Von Neumann theorem, all the
single type fractional assignments are decomposable. For i ≤ p, let A i be the set of all the
single type deterministic assignments for type i, Ai be an arbitrary assignment in A i, and
we use α i to denote the possibility of Ai. Therefore Pi = ∑(α ik×Aik) for every i≤ p.
We first give a obvious claim that single type deterministic assignments of p types decide
an unique multi-type deterministic assignments, and vice versa. Specifically, for any multi-
type deterministic assignment A ∈ A and A1, . . . ,Ap comprising A, we have that for every
x ∈D and oi = Di(x),
A j,x =
p
∏
i=1
Aij,oi . (15)
That means agent j is assigned bundle x if she is assigned all the items in x. We show an
example of types {F,B} for agent {1,2} as follows:
Agent
PF PB
1F 2F 1B 2B
1 1 0 0 1
2 0 1 1 0
Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 1 0
Then by definition of LexiPS we obtain that for any x ∈D and any oi = Di(x),
p j,x =∏
i≤p
pij,oi =∏
i≤p
∑
Aik∈A i
(α ik× (Aik) j,oi) (16)
The result of (16) is a product of p polynomials, and we can write it as one polynomial and
induce as below:
(16) = ∑
A1k1
∈A 1,A2k2∈A
2,...,Apkp∈A p
∏
i≤p
(α iki × (Aiki) j,oi)
= ∑
A1k1
∈A 1,A2k2∈A
2,...,Apkp∈A p
(∏
i≤p
α iki ×∏
i≤p
(Aiki) j,oi)
(17)
Given A1k1 ,A
2
k2
, . . . ,Apkp , let Ak be the corresponding multi-type assignment consisting of
them and αk = ∏i≤pα iki is the probability of Ak where α
i
ki
is the probability of Aiki for P
i.
With (15) we have:
(16) = ∑
Ak∈A
(αk× (Ak) j,x)
Therefore P is decomposable. uunionsq
Remark 2 LexiPS does not satisfy lexi-efficiency. In Example 3, agent 1’s allocation in P,
denoted p here, is lexicographically dominated by the following allocation q:
Agent 1F 1B 1F 3B 2F 1B 2F 3B 3F 2B
1 0.5 0 0 0.5 0
We note that q can be obtained by reallocating the shares of items in p.
However, in resistance against manipulation, LexiPS does not perform as well as PS
just like most extensions. Theorem 3 shows that LexiPS is sd-weak-strategyproof if the
importance orders reported by agents are ensured to be truthful. We also show in Remark 3
how an agent cheats by misreporting her importance order.
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Theorem 3 For MTRAs with lexicographic preferences, LexiPS satisfies sd-weak-strategy
proofness when agents report importance orders truthfully.
Proof In the following proof, we use oi to refer to an arbitrary item of type i, and (oi∗) to
refer to any bundle containing oi. We also use (oi∗) as a shorthand to refer to an arbitary
bundle containing oi.
Suppose agent j misreports its preference as ′j for some types and acquire a better
allocation. Label the type according to B j and let i be the most important type for which j
misreports. Let P = LexiPS(R), R′ = (′j,− j) and Q = LexiPS(R′). Then by assumption
we have that Q sdj P,Q 6= P and piˆj,o = qiˆj,o for every iˆ < i. The phase when agent j
consumes items in Di can be viewed as executing PS of type i. By [8], PS satisfies sd-weak-
strategyproofness, which means Qi sdj Pi is false. Thus there exists oˆi which satisfies
∑
o∈U(ij ,oˆi)
pij,o > ∑
o∈U(ij ,oˆi)
qij,o (18)
With (11) and (12) in Theorem 2, we can simplify (18) and obtain that for xˆ = (oˆ1, . . . , oˆi∗),
∑
x∈{(oˆ1,...,oˆi−1,oi∗)|oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)}
p j,x > ∑
x∈{(oˆ1,...,oˆi−1,oi∗)|oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)}
q j,x.
It is equal to ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x > ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) q j,x, which means agent j does not obtain a better
allocation in Q, a contradiction. uunionsq
Remark 3 When applying LexiPS to MTRAs with lexicographic preferences, an agent may
get a better allocation by misreporting her importance order.
Proof Consider a MTRA with lexicographic preferences where there are agents 1,2 and
types F,B,T . Agents both prefer 1i to 2i for i ∈ {F,B,T}, but their preferences over bundle
are different due to their importance orders as follow:
Agent Importance Order
1 F B1 BB1 T
2 T B2 F B2 B
LexiPS gives the fractional assignment denoted P. If agent 2 misreports her importance
order as B2: F B2 T B2 B, LexiPS gives another fractional assignment denoted P′. Both P
and P′ are shown as follows (To save space, we omit the columns which only contain 0,
similarly hereinafter.):
Agent
P
1F 1B2T 2F 2B1T
1 1 0
2 0 1
Agent
P′
1F 1B2T 1F 2B1T 2F 1B2T 2F 2B1T
1 0.5 0 0.5 0
2 0 0.5 0 0.5
We observe that compared with P, agent 2 loses 0.5 shares of 2F 2B1T , but acquires 0.5
shares of 1F 2B1T in P′. Since 1F 2B1T 2 2F 2B1T , we obtain that P′ sd2 P, but P sd2 P′
is false, which means LexiPS does not satisfy sd-weak-strategyproofness when an agent can
misreport her importance order. uunionsq
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5 MPS for MTRAs with divisible items
In this section we only consider MTRA with divisible items, which is not affected by The-
orem 1. We present a simplified version of MPS [43] in Algorithm 2, since we no longer
need to deal with partial preferences. At a high level, in MPS agents consume bundles con-
sisting of items in contrast with PS where agents consume items directly. Under strict linear
preferences, we prove that MPS satisfies lexi-efficiency, which implies sd-efficiency, and
provide two characterizations involving leximin-optimality and item-wise ordinal fairness
respectively.
5.1 Algorithm for MPS
Given an MTRA, MPS proceeds in multiple rounds as follows: In the beginning of each
round, M′ contains all items that are unexhausted. Agent j first decides her most preferred
available bundle top( j) according to j. A bundle x is available so long as every item o∈ x
is unexhausted. Then, each agent consumes the bundle by consuming all of the items in it
at a uniform rate of one unit per unit of time. The round ends whenever one of the bundles
being consumed becomes unavailable because an item being consumed has been exhausted.
The algorithm terminates when all the items are exhausted.
Algorithm 2 MPS for MTRAs under strict linear preference.
1: Input: An MTRA (N,M) and a preference profile R.
2: For every o ∈M, supply(o)← 1. M′←M. P← 0n×|D |.
3: while M′ 6= /0 do
4: Identify top bundle top( j) for every agent j ≤ n.
5: Consume.
5.1: For any o ∈M′, consumers(o)← |{ j ∈ N : o ∈ top( j)}|.
5.2: ρ ←mino∈M′ supply(o)consumers(o) .
5.3: For each j ≤ n, p j,top( j)← p j,top( j)+ρ .
5.4: For each o ∈M′, supply(o)← supply(o)−ρ × consumers(o).
6: B← argmino∈M′ supply(o)consumers(o) , M′←M′ \B
7: return P
Example 4 The execution of MPS for the following instance of MTRA is shown in Fig. 2.
Agent Preferences
1 1F 1B 1 1F 2B 1 2F 2B 1 2F 1B
2 1F 2B 2 2F 1B 2 1F 1B 2 2F 2B
Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0.5 0 0 0.5
2 0 0.5 0.5 0
At round 1, agent 1’s top bundle is 1F 1B, and agent 2’s top bundle is 1F 2B. Notice that
both agents wish to consume 1F . Therefore, round 1 ends as 1F gets exhausted with both
agents getting a share of 0.5 units of 1F . Agents 1 and 2 also consume 1B and 2B respectively
at the same rate during round 1. At the end of round 1, agents 1 and 2 are assigned with a
0.5 share of 1F 1B and 1F 2B respectively.
At the start of round 2, there is a supply of 1 unit of 2F and 0.5 units each of 1B and
2B. Agent 1’s top available bundle is 2F 2B since 1F 2B is unavailable for the exhausted item
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1F , and agent 2’s top available bundle is 2F 1B accordingly. The agents consume the items of
each type from their top bundles at a uniform rate and at the end of the round, all items are
exhausted, and agents 1 and 2 have consumed 0.5 units each of 2F 2B and 2F 1B respectively,
which results in the final assignment as shown in Fig. 2, which is the undecomposable
assignment P in Example 1.
Further, we show in Remark 4 that even under lexicographic preferences, the output of
MPS is not always decomposable. This means that MPS is only applicable to MTRAs with
divisible items.
Fig. 2 An example of the execution of MPS.
Remark 4 The output of MPS is not always a decomposable assignment under the restric-
tion of lexicographic preferences.
Proof For the MTRA in Example 3, MPS outputs the following fractional assignment, de-
noted P:
Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B 2F 3B 3F 2B 3F 3B
1 1/3 0 1/6 1/6 0 1/12 1/4
2 1/3 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/3
3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/12 1/4
When items are indivisible, if agent 2 get 2F 3B, agent 1 will get 1F 1B and agent 3 will get
3F 2B as P indicates. However, p1,1F 1B = 1/3, p2,2F 3B = 1/6, p3,3F 2B = 1/12 are not equal,
which is a contradiction. uunionsq
5.2 Efficiency and Generalized Cycles
Under the unrestricted domain of strict linear preferences, Theorem 2 in [43] implies that
MPS satisfies sd-efficiency. We prove in Theorem 4 below that MPS satisfies lexi-efficiency,
which is a stronger notion of efficiency than sd-efficiency, as we will prove in Proposition 1
later.
Theorem 4 MPS satisfies lexi-efficiency.
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Proof Given MTRA(M,N) and preference profile R, let P = MPS(R), and suppose another
assignment Q satisfies Qlexi P. Let Nˆ be the set of agents which have different allocations
in Q, and by assumption we have that for any j ∈ Nˆ, there exists a bundle x satisfies q j,x >
p j,x and q j,xˆ = p j,xˆ for any xˆ j x. W.l.o.g. let j be the agent with smallest∑xˆ jx p j,xˆ, and let
t denote the value. However, when MPS executes till time t, x is unavailable, which means
that at least one item in x is exhausted and p j,x cannot be increased anymore. Therefore if
agent j gains more shares of x in Q, there is another agent who lose shares before t, which
is a contradiction. uunionsq
We establish the relationship between lexi-efficiency and sd-efficiency in Proposition 1
through the no-generalized-cycle condition (Definition 11), by showing that sd-efficiency
is implied by the no-generalized-cycle condition, which is implied by lexi-efficiency. We
begin by borrowing the tool named generalized cycle from Wang et al. [43], which is based
on the relation τ and the notion of improvable tuples defined as follows:
Definition 10 (improvable tuples [43]) Given a fractional assignment P, and a profile R =
( j) j≤n,
– for pair of bundles x, xˆ ∈D , xτ xˆ ⇐⇒ there exists an agent j ≤ n, such that x j xˆ and
p j,xˆ > 0.
– for any pair of bundles x, xˆ ∈D , (x, xˆ) is an improvable tuple if and only if xτ xˆ, and
– Imp(P,R) is the set of all improvable tuples admitted by assignment P w.r.t. the prefer-
ence profile R.
For ease of exposition, we use Imp(P) to refer to the set of all improvable tuples admit-
ted by the fractional assignment P when the profile is clear from the context. We are now
ready to formally define the no-generalized-cycle condition.
Definition 11 (no-generalized-cycle [43]) Given an MTRA (N,M,R) and a fractional as-
signment P, a set C ⊆ Imp(P,R) is a generalized cycle if it holds for every o ∈ M that: if
an improvable tuple (x1, xˆ1) ∈C satisfies that o ∈ x1, then there exists a tuple (x2, xˆ2) ∈C
such that o ∈ xˆ2. An assignment P satisfies no-generalized-cycle, if it admits no generalized
cycles.
When p = 1, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] proved that an assignment is sd-efficient if
and only if the relation τ on it is acyclic, i.e. there does not exists x1τx2τ · · ·τx1. However,
this condition fails for MTRAs. Example 5 shows that an assignment which does not satisfy
sd-efficiency satisfies the acyclicity of τ , but admits a generalized cycle, which means the
generalized cycle is more reliable in identifying sd-efficient assignments.
Example 5 We illustrate generalized cycles, with the following assignment Q for the MTRA
in Example 4. Note that Q is not sd-efficient because the assignment P in Example 4 stochas-
tically dominates Q.
Agent
Q
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0.4 0 0 0.6
2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0
Agent Improvable Tuples
1
(1F 1B,2F 2B),(1F 2B,2F 2B),
(2F 1B,2F 2B)
2
(1F 2B,2F 1B),(1F 2B,1F 1B),
(2F 1B,1F 1B)
It is easy to see that τ is acyclic on Q. However, it is easy to verify that there is a
generalized cycle on Q: {(1F 1B,2F 2B),(1F 2B,2F 1B),(2F 1B,1F 1B)}. Consider for example
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the items in type B: 1B is present in both components of (2F 1B,1F 1B), and 2B is present
in the left component of (1F 2B,2F 1B) and the right component of (1F 1B,2F 2B). A similar
analysis can be performed for the items of type F .
Proposition 1 reveals the relationship between lexi-efficiency and sd-efficiency vis-a`-
vis the no-generalized-cycle condition. Unlike Bogomolnaia [6] who point out that lexi-
efficiency and sd-efficiency are equivalent in their setting where p = 1, because both of
them are equivalent to acyclicity condition on the relation τ , we show that this is no longer
true for MTRAs.
Proposition 1 Given a preference profile R and a fractional assignment P,
(1) P is sd-efficient regarding R if P admits no generalized cycle.
(2) P is lexi-efficient regarding R only if P admits no generalized cycle.
Proof (1) The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5, Claim (1) in Wang et al. [43]. A
full proof is provided in Appendix A.2 for completeness.
(2) Suppose by contradiction there is a lexi-efficient assignment P which admits a gen-
eralized cycle C. For any agent j, let (x, xˆ) ∈ C be the one of tuple she involves, and let x
be top ranked among bundles in all the tuples involved j. For every ok ∈ x, we can find a
tuple (xk, xˆk) ∈C which satisfies that o ∈ xˆk and p jˆ,xˆk > 0 for some jˆ by definition. Then we
extract shares of each xˆk by a small enough value ε , and we can have ε shares of x with the
shares of each ok from xˆk. And to keep the supply of bundle not beyond her demand, she
should give out the same shares of xˆ. It is trivial that the shares of items in xˆ and rest items
in each xˆk can be combined as bundles with no share left for single items, and we just assign
them arbitrarily to agents who donate xˆk to meet their demands. We note that ε is chosen
to be small enough so that the shares of bundles above are not used up, and therefore they
can be used for other agents. Let Q be the new assignment after we do the step above for all
the agents. In this way, for any agent j with the chosen tuple (x, xˆ), it gains shares of x and
maybe other bundles, with loss of shares of xˆ and other bundles ranked behind x. It follows
that Q j,x ≥ Pj,x + ε > Pj,x and for any x′  j x, Q j,x′ ≥ Pj,x′ because agent j gains but not
loses the shares of these bundles, which means Qlexi P, a contradiction. uunionsq
Remark 5 The no-generalized-cycle condition is not a necessary condition of sd-efficiency.
Consider an MTRA with two agents where 1,2 are the same as 1F 1B 1 1F 2B 1
2F 1B 1 2F 2B. We find that the assignment P in Example 4 is sd-efficient for this MTRA
but admits a generalized cycle (not unique): {(1F 1B,1F 2B),(1F 2B,2F 1B),(2F 1B,2F 2B)}.
The no-generalized-cycle condition is also not a sufficient condition of lexi-efficiency. With
the 1,2 above, the following assignment admits no generalized cycle, but is not lexi-
efficient:
Agent 1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1,2 0 0.5 0.5 0
In Theorem 5, we characterize the entire set of assigments that do not admit generalized
cycles by the family of eating algorithms for MTRAs (Algorithm 3), which is a natural
extension of the family of eating algorithms introduced in Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] for
the single type setting. Each eating algorithm is specified by a collection of exogenous eating
speed functions ω = (ω j) j≤n. An eating speed function ω j specifies the instantaneous rate
at which agent j consumes bundles, consisting of an item of each type, at each instant t ∈
[0,1], such that the integral
∫ 1
t=0ω j(t) is 1. In an eating algorithm, in each round, each agent
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j consumes her most preferred available bundle at the rate specified by her eating speed
function ω j, until the supply of one of the items in one of the bundles being consumed is
exhausted. Note that MPS is a special case of the family of eating algorithms, with ω j(t) = 1
for all t ∈ [0,1], and all j ≤ n.
Algorithm 3 Eating Algorithms
1: Input: An MTRA (N,M) and a preference profile R.
2: Parameters: Eating speed functions ω = (ω j) j≤n.
3: For every o ∈M, supply(o)← 1. M′←M. P← 0n×|D |. t← 0.
4: while M′ 6= /0 and t < 1 do
5: Identify top bundle top( j) for every agent j ≤ n.
6: Consume.
5.1: For any o ∈M′, consumers(o)← |{ j ∈ N : o ∈ top( j)}|.
5.2: ρ ←min{ρ |∑ j∈consumers(o)
∫ t+ρ
t ω j = supply(o),o ∈M′}.
5.3: For each j ≤ n, p j,top( j)← p j,top( j)+
∫ t+ρ
t ω j .
5.4: For each o ∈M′, supply(o)← supply(o)−∑ j∈consumers(o)
∫ t+ρ
t ω j .
7: M′←M′ \{o ∈M′|supply(o) = 0}. t← t+ρ .
8: return P
Theorem 5 An assignment satisfies no-generalized-cycle if and only if the assignment is
the output of an eating algorithm (Algorithm 3).
Proof (⇐) The proof that an assignment P, which is an output of an eating algorithm satis-
fies no-generalized-cycle is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, Claim (1).
(⇒) Let R be an arbitrary preference profile, and let P be an arbitrary assignment satis-
fying no-generalized-cycle w.r.t. R. For convenience, we define some quantities to represent
the state during the execution of a member of the family of eating algorithms at each round s.
For ease of exposition, we use s= 0 to represent the initial state before the start of execution.
Let M0 = M, D0 =D . Let Bs = {o ∈Ms−1 : there are no x, xˆ ∈D s−1 s.t. o ∈ xˆ and (x, xˆ) ∈
Imp(P)}, Ms = Ms−1 −Bs and D s = {x ∈ D : for every o ∈ x,o ∈ Ms} be the available
bundles in Ms. Let S = min{s : Ms = /0}. Let ω j(t) be the eating rate of agent j at time t,
N(x,D s) be the set of agents who prefer x best in the available bundles D s for any x ∈D s.
The following eating speed functions ω j define the algorithm:
∀s≤ S, s−1
S
≤ t ≤ s
S
,ω j(t)
def
=
{
S× p j,x, ∃o ∈ x,o ∈ Bs and j ∈ N(x,D s−1)
0, otherwise.
From the design of algorithm, we know that items in Bs decide which bundles in D s−1 are
consumed in round s, and these items are not consumed after the round s. We claim that
the algorithm specified by the eating speed functions ω = (ω j) j≤n above, outputs P for the
MTRA with preference profile R. Let Q be the output of the eating algorithm and we prove
P=Q by proving with induction that for any s ∈ [1,S], o ∈ Bs, x ∈D s−1 s.t. o ∈ x, we prove
for each j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x. The base case where s = 1 is omitted here, and we provide a
proof sketch for the inductive step in the following. The full proof is in Appendix A.4.
Inductive step. With the assumption that p j,x = q j,x for any o ∈ ⋃sk=1 Bk, x ∈ D s.t. o ∈ x
and any j ∈ N, we prove that: for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈D s.t. o ∈ x and any j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x.
If x is not in D s, then there is an item oˆ ∈ ⋃sk=1 Bk s.t. oˆ ∈ x and we have p j,x = q j,x by the
assumption. For o ∈ Bs+1 and x ∈ D s s.t. o ∈ x, if x is not most preferred in D s by some
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agent j, then p j,x = 0, because if p j,x > 0, then let xˆ be the most preferred bundle by j in
D s and we have (xˆ,x) ∈ Imp(P) where o ∈ x, a contradiction to the construction of Bs+1.
Therefore we have the following equation by construction
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
p j,x+ ∑
o∈x,x∈D\Ds
∑
j∈N
p j,x = ∑
o∈x,x∈D
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1.
That implies for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈D s s.t. o ∈ x, if j is not in N(x,D s), then p j,x = 0.
For any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈ D s s.t. o ∈ x and j ∈ N(x,D s), we prove that agent j consumes
exactly p j,x units of bundle x. By the assumption, o remains available in sS ≤ t ≤ s+1S and
agent j consumes x in sS ≤ t ≤ s+1S . We know that q j,x = 0 by time sS , and by time s+1S ,
q j,x = 1S ×S× p j,x = p j,x. That means
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
q j,x+ ∑
o∈x,x∈D\Ds
∑
j∈N
q j,x = ∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
p j,x+ ∑
o∈x,x∈D\Ds
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1
That implies for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈ D s s.t. o ∈ x, (i) if j ∈ N(x,D s), then q j,x = p j,x; (ii) if
j is not in N(x,D s), then q j,x = 0 = p j,x. Therefore, for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈D s s.t. o ∈ x and
any j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x. uunionsq
5.3 Fairness and Characterization
For CP-net preferences, Theorem 5 in Wang et al. [43] showed that MPS satisfies sd-envy-
freeness for CP-net preferences. Here CP-net determines the dependence among preferences
of types, which also reflects the importance of each type. Since the domain of CP-net pref-
erences and strict linear preferences are not totally overlapping, we provide Proposition 2 as
complement and the proof is in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 2 MPS satisfies sd-envy-freeness for MTRAs.
By [43], MPS is sd-weak-strategyproof if all the agents share the same CP-net, which
means their importance orders are identical. We prove that under lexicographic preferences,
MPS satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness, and in particular, the importance orders of agents
can be different.
Theorem 6 MPS satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness for MTRAs with lexicographic prefer-
ences.
Proof Consider an arbitrary MTRA (N,M) and an arbitrary lexicographic preference pro-
file R. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that an agent j can obtain a better allocation
by misreporting her preference as another lexicographic preference′j. Throughout, we use
P = MPS(R) and Q = MPS(R′), where R′ = (′j,− j). By assumption of beneficial misre-
porting, we have Q sdj P. We will show that Q j = Pj.
We claim that Qij = P
i
j for every type i≤ p, where Pij is agent j’s single type allocations
of type i at P and Qij the same at Q. W.l.o.g. let the types be labeled such that 1B j · · ·B j p.
For convenience, for any type i ≤ p, we define oi to be an item o of type i, and (oi∗) to be
an arbitrary bundle containing oi.
Claim 1 Under lexicographic preferences, (MPS(R))i = PS(Ri), where Ri = (ij) j≤n.
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The claim is obtained by comparing the execution of MPS with PS in each type. The full
proof of the claim is in Appendix A.5. Since PS satisfies sd-weak-strategyproofness [8], we
deduce from Claim 1 that for each type i ≤ p, Qi sdj Pi ⇒ Qij = Pij. Therefore we can
prove Qij = P
i
j by showing Q
i sdj Pi instead, by induction.
First we assume Q1 6sdj P1. That means there exists oˆ1 such that ∑o∈U(ij ,oˆ1) p
1
j,o >
∑o∈U(ij ,oˆ1) q
1
j,o. Let xˆ be the least preferred bundle containing oˆ1. It follows that
∑
o∈U(ij ,oˆ1)
p1j,o = ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
p j,x > ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
q j,x = ∑
o∈U(ij ,oˆ1)
q1j,o,
which is a contradiction to our assumption. Thus Q1j = P
1
j .
Next we prove that for any type i ≤ p when Qiˆj = Piˆj for every iˆ < i. For arbitrary
oˆ1, oˆ2, . . . , oˆi, let xˆ = (oˆ1, . . . , oˆi∗) be the least preferred bundle containing them. Because
Q sdj P, we have ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x ≤ ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) q j,x, and we take apart the sum like:
∑
x∈{(o1∗)|o11j oˆ1}
p j,x+ ∑
x∈{(oˆ1,o2∗)|o22j oˆ2}
p j,x
+ · · ·+ ∑
x∈{(oˆ1,oˆ2,...,oi−1∗)|oi−1i−1j oˆi−1}
p j,x+ ∑
x∈Si
p j,x
(19)
Here we use Si to refer to the set {(oˆ1, . . . , oˆi−1,oi∗)|oi ∈U(ij, oˆi)}. Claim 2 follows from
the observation that agents consume bundles until unavailable. The full proof of the claim is
in Appendix A.6.
Claim 2 For P = MPS(R), given a fixed i′ and Qiˆj = Piˆj for any iˆ≤ i′, if Q sdj P, then for
Siˆ = {(oˆ1, . . . , oˆiˆ−1,oiˆ∗)|oiˆ ∈U(iˆj, oˆiˆ)},∑x∈Siˆ p j,x = ∑x∈Siˆ q j,x.
With (19) and Claim 2 we obtain ∑x∈Si p j,x ≤ ∑x∈Si q j,x. We can sum up the inequality
by oˆ1, oˆ2, . . . , oˆi−1 like
∑ˆ
o1
∑ˆ
o2
· · · ∑ˆ
oi−1
∑
x∈Si
p j,x ≤ ∑ˆ
o1
∑ˆ
o2
· · · ∑ˆ
oi−1
∑
x∈Si
p j,x.
Then we have
∑
x∈{(oi∗)|oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)}
p j,x ≤ ∑
x∈{(oi∗)|oi∈U(ij ,oˆi)}
q j,x
It is equal to ∑oi∈U(ij ,oˆi) p
i
j,oi ≤ ∑oi∈U(ij ,oˆi) q
i
j,oi , which means Q
i sdj Pi.
We have proved that Qij = P
i
j for every i ≤ p. By Claim 2, agent j has the same share
over each upper contour set and therefore Q j = Pj. uunionsq
In Theorem 7 we provide two characterizations for MPS. The leximin-optimality reflects
the egalitarian nature of the PS mechanism, which means that the mechanism always tries
to balance the shares over top ranked items/bundles among all the agents. MPS retains this
nature for MTRAs with strict linear preferences. The item-wise ordinal fairness is extended
from [22]. We note that item-wise ordinal fairness involves the cumulative shares regarding
items, different from the version in [43] which only involves the share of each bundle.
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Theorem 7 MPS is the unique mechanism which (I) satisfies leximin-optimality, and (II) sat-
isfies item-wise ordinal fairness.
Proof (I) leximin-optimality: Let R be any profile of strict linear preferences. Let P =
MPS(R), u= (u j,x) j≤n,x∈D . For j≤ n, and bundle x∈D , let u j,x =∑xˆ∈U( j ,x) p j,xˆ. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that P is not leximin-optimal. Then, there exists a fractional
assignment Q, such that for v = (v j,x) j≤n,x∈D , where v j,x = ∑xˆ∈U( j ,x) q j,xˆ, it holds that
(v,u) ∈ L, where L is the leximin relation (Definition 7). Let u∗ constructed by sorting the
components of u in ascending order, and v∗ be defined on v similarly.
We prove by induction that v∗ = u∗, i.e. v∗k = u
∗
k for all k, and the corresponding assign-
ments P and Q are identical.
Base case. As the basis of induction, we prove that u∗1 = v
∗
1. Suppose for the sake of con-
tradiction that u∗1 < v
∗
1. We use the tuple ( j,x) as the index of the component u j,x, for every
agent j ≤ n, and bundle x ∈ D . Let S1 be the set of indices, such that for each ( j,x) ∈ S1,
u j,x = u∗1.
We consider the corresponding elements in v indicated by the set S1. We note that for
each ( j,x) ∈ S1, there are two possible cases:
Case 1. x is the most preferred bundle w.r.t.  j. Then, p j,x = ∑x′∈U( j,x) p j,x′ = u∗1, and
u∗1 < v
∗
1, implies that p j,x = u
∗
1 < v
∗
1 ≤ ∑x′∈U( j,x) q j,x′ = q j,x,
Case 2. x is not the most preferred bundle w.r.t.  j. Then, for the most preferred bundle xˆ
w.r.t. j, there must exist p j,xˆ = u∗1 as in Case 1, since u∗1 ≤∑x′∈U( j,xˆ) p j,x′ ≤∑x′∈U( j,x) p j,x′
= u∗1. This implies that p j,x = 0≤ q j,x.
From the execution of MPS, x must be unavailable at time u∗1 because some items in it
are exhausted at that time. Let B1 denote the set of the items exhausted at time u∗1. For any
o ∈ B1, we have that ∑( j′,x′)∈S1,o∈x′ p j′,x′ = 1. With the inequality in Case 1 and Case 2 we
have∑( j′,x′)∈S1,o∈x′ q j′,x′ >∑( j′,x)∈S1,o∈x′ p j′,x′ = 1 for some o∈ B1, which is a contradiction.
Having shown that u∗1 = v
∗
1, we claim that the shares indicated by S1 are equal in P and Q,
i.e. for any ( j,x) ∈ S1, p j,x = q j,x. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, there exists a tuple
( j,x) ∈ S1 such that p j,x < q j,x, then for any o ∈ x such that o ∈ B1, there must exist ( jˆ, xˆ) ∈
S1 such that xˆ contains o and p jˆ,xˆ > q jˆ,xˆ ≥ 0, because for any o∈ B1 ∑( j′,x′)∈S1,o∈x′ p j′,x′ = 1.
By Case 1 we know that xˆ is most preferred by agent jˆ, and therefore u∗1 =∑x′∈U( jˆ ,xˆ) p jˆ,x′ >
∑x′∈U( jˆ ,xˆ) q jˆ,x′ which means (u,v) ∈ L, a contradiction to the assumption. The claim also
means that for all k ≤ |S1|, u∗k = u∗1 = v∗k .
Inductive step. Next, we prove by induction that for any k > 1, u∗k = v
∗
k given u
∗
k > u
∗
k−1,
and u∗l = v
∗
l for l < k, and p j,x = q j,x for any ( j,x) ∈ Sl , l < k. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that u∗k < v
∗
k . Let Sk be the set of indices, such that for each ( j,x) in Sk, u j,x =
u∗k . Let Sk be the set of tuples which correspond to u
∗
k . For ( j,x) ∈ Sk, let xˆ be the least
preferred bundle in {x′|x′  j x} w.r.t.  j, and its corresponding index is ( j, xˆ). Then, we
have p j,x = u∗k −u j,xˆ. Let u∗l = u j,xˆ. By our intial assumption that (v,u) ∈ L, we claim that
for all ( j,x) ∈ Sk, p j,x ≤ q j,x and strict for some indices, because
Case 1’. if ( j, xˆ) /∈ Sk, then we have that l < k and u∗k > u∗l = v∗l , and therefore p j,x =
u∗k−u∗l < v∗k− v∗l = q j,x,
Case 2’. if ( j, xˆ) ∈ Sk, then u∗l = u∗k and p j,x = 0≤ q j,x.
W.l.o.g let x satisfy p j,x < q j,x. We know x is unavailable at time u∗k in the execution of MPS
because of exhausted items in it. Let Bk be the set of items exhausted at time u∗k . For any
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o ∈ Bk, we have
∑
( j′,x′)∈∪l<kSl ,o∈x′
p j′,x′ = ∑
( j′,x′)∈∪l<kSl ,o∈x′
q j′,x′
∑
( j′,x′)∈∪l<kSl ,o∈x′
p j′,x′ + ∑
( j′,x′)∈Sk ,o∈x′
p j′,x′ = 1.
(20)
Thus we have ∑( j′,x′)∈∪l≤kSl ,o∈x q j′,x′ >∑( j′,x′)∈∪l≤kSl ,o∈x p j′,x′ = 1 for some o ∈ Bk, which is
a contradiction.
Then we show if the shares indicated by Sk in P and Q are equal. With u∗k = v
∗
k , we claim
that
for any ( j,x) ∈ Sk, p j,x = q j,x. (21)
If a tuple ( j,x) ∈ Sk satisfies p j,x < q j,x, there must exist some ( jˆ, xˆ) ∈ Sk such that p jˆ,xˆ >
q jˆ,xˆ ≥ 0 by (20) since p j′,x′ = q j′,x′ for ( j′,x′) ∈ Sl , l < k. Because p jˆ,xˆ > 0, by Case 1’ we
know that u∗k = u jˆ,xˆ > v jˆ,xˆ which means (u,v)∈ L, a contradiction to the assumption. By the
claim we also know that for all k ≤ l < k+ |Sk|, u∗l = u∗k .
By induction, we have u∗k = v
∗
k for all k ≤ n|D | and therefore u = v. Besides, since⋃
k<=|u| Sk = N×D , from (21) we have that p j,x = q j,x for any j ∈ N,x ∈D .
(II) item-wise ordinal fairness: We use the relation of time and consumption to make the
proof and show the uniqueness. Given any MTRA(M,N) and preference profile R, let P =
MPS(R) in the following proof.
Satisfaction: For an arbitrary agent j and any bundle x, let t = ∑x′∈U( j ,x) p j,x. We assume
by contradiction that there exists an agent k who gets shares of bundle xˆ containing o i.e.
pk,xˆ > 0, and tˆ = ∑x′∈U(k ,xˆ) pk,x > t. From the relation of time and consumption, we know
that at time t, x is unavailable and therefore the supply of some item o ∈ x is exhausted. We
note that t is not necessary to be the exact time when x become unavailable. We also know
that at time tˆ, xˆ become unavailable, and therefore for t < t ′ < tˆ, xˆ is still available, which
also means o ∈ xˆ is not exhausted, which is a contradiction.
Uniqueness: Suppose Q is another item-wise ordinal fair assignment by contradiction. For
some agent j, we can find by comparing P and Q that a bundle x which satisfies p j,x 6=
q j,x and p j,xˆ = q j,xˆ for xˆ  j x. W.l.o.g. let agent j and x just mentioned satisfy that t =
min(∑x′∈U( j ,x) p j,x′ ,∑x′∈U( j ,x) q j,x′) is the smallest among all the agents and bundles. By
the selection of j and x, we have pk,xˆ = qk,xˆ for (k, xˆ) ∈ S = {(k, xˆ)|∑x′∈(k ,xˆ) q j,x′ ≤ t}.
We first claim that p j,x > q j,x, i.e. t = ∑x′∈U( j ,x) q j,x′ . Otherwise, if p j,x < q j,x, then
agent j get more shares of x in Q and therefore demands more supply of item contained in
x. Since the assumption also means t = ∑x′∈U( j ,x) p j,x′ , we know that in P there exists an
item o ∈ x exhausted at t which makes x unavailable, and the supply of o is also used up
in Q for agents and bundles in S. Therefore the extra demand of o for agent j on bundle x
comes from agent k on bundle xˆ containing o such that (k, xˆ) ∈ S, which means qk,xˆ < pk,xˆ,
a contradiction.
Since p j,x > q j,x i.e. t =∑x′∈U( j ,x) q j,x′ now, which means agent j gives up some shares
of x in Q, and thus for every o ∈ x we can find out some agent k and xˆ containing o such
that k gains more shares of xˆ in Q, i.e. qk,xˆ > pk,xˆ ≥ 0. By the definition of t, we have
∑x′∈(k ,xˆ) q j,x′ > t = ∑x′∈( j ,x) q j,x′ . Therefore every o ∈ x does not meet the condition of
item-wise ordinal fairness, which is contradictory to the assumption that Q 6=P is item-wise
ordinal fair. uunionsq
Remark 6 MPS does not satisfy sd-weak-strategyproofness.
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Proof Consider an MTRA with two agents where 1,2 are as below:
Agent Preferences
1 1F 2B 1 1F 1B 1 2F 1B 1 2F 2B
2 1F 1B 2 2F 1B 2 2F 2B 2 1F 2B
MPS outputs P for this preference profile. If agent 1 misreports1 as′1: 2F 1B 1 1F 1B 1
1F 2B 1 2F 2B, then MPS outputs P′. Both P and P′ are shown as below:
Agent
P
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0 0.5 0.25 0.25
2 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
Agent
P′
1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 0 0.5 0.5 0
2 0.5 0 0 0.5
We have that P′ sd1 P and P′ 6= P by shifting agent 1’s share from 2F 2B to 2F 1B, which
violates the requirement of sd-weak-strategyproofness i.e. P′1 = P1 if P
′ sd1 P. uunionsq
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In the paper, we first point out that it is impossible to design sd-efficient and sd-envy-free
mechanisms for MTRAs with indivisible items. However, under the natural assumption that
agents’ preferences are lexicographic, we propose LexiPS as a mechanism which can deal
with indivisible items while satisfying the desired efficiency and fairness properties of sd-
efficiency and sd-envy-freeness.
For divisible items, we show that MPS satisfies the stronger efficiency notion of lexi-
efficiency in addition to sd-envy-freeness under the unrestricted domain of linear prefer-
ences, and is sd-weak-strategyproof under lexicographic preferences, which complement
the results in [43]. We also provide two separate characterizations for MPS by leximin-
optimality and item-wise ordinal fairness. We also show that every assignment that satisfies
no-generalized-cycle, a sufficient condition for sd-efficiency, can be computed by an eating
algorithm.
Characterizing the domain of preferences under which it is possible to design mecha-
nisms for MTRAs with indivisible items that are simultaneously fair, efficient, and strat-
egyproof is an exciting topic for future research. For divisible items, characterizations of
mechanisms for MTRAs satisfying sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness, in addition to other
combinations of desirable properties, is an interesting topic for future work. In addition, de-
veloping efficient and fair mechanisms for natural extensions of the MTRA problem such
as settings where there are demands for multiple units of each type, or initial endowments is
also an exciting new avenue for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Remark 1
We use the MTRA with the following LP-tree preference profile R as a tool to prove the tighter result. We
also show 1 by a LP-tree.
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Agent Preferences
1 1F 1B 1 1F 2B 1 2F 2B 1 2F 1B
2 1F 2B 2 1F 1B 2 2F 1B 2 2F 2B
Suppose that f satisfies sd-weak-efficiency and sd-weak-envy-freeness, and let Q= f (R). As in the proof
of Theorem 1, we show that such an decomposable assignment Q in the following does not exist.
Agent Q1F 1B 1F 2B 2F 1B 2F 2B
1 v w y z
2 z y w v
From agent 1’s preference, we observe that she does not get shares of 1F 2B and 2F 1B simultaneously,
because that means she can mix up the items in them to get 1F 1B that better than 1F 2B and 2F 2B that better
than 2F 1B. With the similar reason, agent 2 does not get shares of 1F 1B and 2F 2B simultaneously. This means
that in the assignment Q, there are at least two variants are 0: either v or z is 0, and either y or w is 0.
We first exclude the case that v,w,y,z are all 0 for v+w+ y+ z = 1, and consider the cases that there
are three variants are 0, which means Q is a discrete assignment. The assignments that assign any agent with
her least preferable bundle, i.e. 2F 1B to agent 1 or 2F 2B to agent 2, are excluded because it violates sd-weak-
envy-freeness. The other possible cases are: If Q assigns 1F 2B to agent 1 and 2F 1B to agent 2, then agent 2
envies agent 1 due to 1F 2B 2 2F 1B; If Q assigns 2F 2B to agent 1 and 1F 1B to agent 2, then agent 1 envies
agent 2 due to 1F 1B 1 2F 2B. Both cases violate sd-weak-envy-freeness.
Therefore the only possibility is that two variants are 0, and we list all the possible combination of
variants as following and explain in brief why they fail to meet the requirements:
(v 6= 0,y 6= 0): There exists a generalized cycle (2F 2B,2F 1B),(2F 1B,2F 2B);
(v 6= 0,w 6= 0): Q1 6= Q2 and Q1 sd2 Q2;
(y 6= 0,z 6= 0): Q2 6= Q1 and Q2 sd1 Q1;
(w 6= 0,z 6= 0): There exists a generalized cycle (1F 1B,1F 2B),(1F 2B,1F 1B).
By (1) in Proposition 1, the existence of generalized cycle means violating sd-efficiency, i.e. sd-weak-
efficiency in this problem since there are only two agents. Therefore we can conclude that such a mechanism
f does not exist. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of (1) in Proposition 1
Proof The proof involves showing that every fractional assignment which is not sd-efficient admits a gener-
alized cycle. Let P be such as fractional assignment for a given MTRA. Then, there exists another fractional
assignment Q 6= P such that Q sd P. We show that the set of tuples which shows the difference between P
and Q is a generalized cycle on P.
Let Nˆ = { j ≤ n : Pj 6= Q j} ⊆ N. By definition of sd-efficiency, for every j ∈ Nˆ, Q sdj P. Let C be the
set of all tuples (x, xˆ) such that x  j xˆ and q j,x > p j,x,q j,xˆ < p j,xˆ for some j ∈ Nˆ. Therefore at a high level,
from C we can learn all the difference of shares for bundles in allocations of agents in P and Q. First we prove
the following claim:
Claim 3 For any agent j ∈ Nˆ, there exists a bundle with a greater share in Q j than in Pj , and this bundle is
ranked above all bundles with a smaller share.
In fact, we can prove the claim by supposing for the sake of contradiction that there is a bundle xˆ with a
smaller share in Q which is ranked above all bundles with a greater share, i.e. for every x  j xˆ, p j,xˆ > q j,xˆ
and p j,x ≥ q j,x. This implies that∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x >∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) q j,x, which is a contradiction to our assumption
that Q sd P.
Then We show that C is not empty. If q j,x ≥ p j,x, j ∈ Nˆ for every x ∈D , then Pj =Q j , a contradiction to
our initial assumption. Thus there exists xˆ which satisfies q j,xˆ < p j,xˆ, which means there is a tuple (x, xˆ) ∈C
according to Claim 3. Therefore, C 6= /0 since P 6= Q. Since p j,xˆ > q j,xˆ ≥ 0, we have that (x, xˆ) ∈ Imp(P),
which implies that C ⊆ Imp(P).
Suppose for sake of contradiction that C is not a generalized cycle. W.l.o.g. let o be an item such that for
any bundle x containing o, x is always the left component of any improvable tuple involving x in C. If so, we
have that:
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(i) for j /∈ Nˆ, q j,x = p j,x trivially by the assumption,
(ii) for j ∈ Nˆ, q j,x ≥ p j,x. Because if q j,x0 < p j,x0 for some x0 containing o, then by Claim 3 there will
be a tuple (xˆ0,x0)∈ Imp(P) where x0 is the right component and x0 contains o, which is a contradiction.
Specifically, for (x, xˆ) ∈C where o ∈ x, q j,x > p j,x exists for some j ∈ Nˆ because otherwise q j,x = p j,x
and therefore x is not in any tuple in C.
Therefore we have ∑ j≤n,o∈x q j,x > ∑ j≤n,o∈x p j,x = 1, a contradiction to our assumption that Q is a fractional
assignment. That means C satisfies one of the requirements of generalized cycle: If an tuple (x1, xˆ1) ∈ C
satisfies that o ∈ x1, then there exists a tuple (x2, xˆ2) ∈C such that o ∈ xˆ2. Thus C is a generalized cycle on
P. uunionsq
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof We begin our proof with any MTRA(N,M) with an arbitrary preference R. Throughout, we use P
to refer to MPS(R). We first give a few observations about MPS which are helpful for understanding the
following proof. We know that MPS executes multiple rounds which end when some items are exhausted and
we label all the rounds by time. Let j be an arbitrary agent. Here we consider the round rkm ∈ {rk1 ,rk2 , . . .}
where agent j stop consuming a bundle. We note that these rounds are not necessarily continuous because
agent j may not change her current most preferred bundles for every round. Without loss of generality, let
rkm < rkmˆ if m < mˆ.
Let xkm denote the bundle consumed by j at round rkm of MPS. Let tk0 = 0, and for any round rkm , let tkm
be the units of time elapsed from the start of the mechanism till the end of round rkm . Then, by construction
of MPS, we have that for any round rkm ,m > 1, p j,xkm = tkm − tkm−1 . Specially, when m = 1, p j,xk1 = tk1 − tk0
trivially. This implies that
tkm = tkm − tk0 =
m
∑ˆ
m=1
(tkmˆ − tkmˆ−1 ) = ∑
x∈U( j ,xkm )
p j,x. (22)
For any round rkm , and any xˆ such that xkm  j xˆ j xkm+1 , xˆ is not consumed by j i.e. p j,xˆ = 0. Therefore it
must hold that xˆ is unavailable by the end of round rkm . Let tˆ denote the time at which xˆ becomes unavailable.
Then,
tˆ ≤ tkm = ∑
x∈U( j ,xkm )
p j,x = ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)
p j,x. (23)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a pair of agents j, jˆ such that j envies jˆ at P. Then,
Pj 6sdj Pjˆ and there exists a bundle xˆ which satisfies ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p jˆ,x > ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x.
Let t = ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x and tˆ = ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p jˆ,x. It is easy to see that it must hold that t < tˆ. The rest of
the proof involves showing that due to the construction of MPS, tˆ ≤ t, contradicting our assumption.
Now, let x′ be the bundle least preferred by jˆ while satisfying x′ ∈U( j, xˆ) and p jˆ,x′ > 0. Such a x′ must
exist. Otherwise, p jˆ,x = 0 for every x ∈U( j, xˆ) which implies that tˆ = 0≤ t, a contradiction.
Let t ′ be the time at which x′ becomes unavailable. Due to U( j,x′)⊆U( j, xˆ), we can deduce that t ′ ≤
∑x∈U( j ,x′) p j,x ≤ ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x = t by (23) . Also, we have t ′ = ∑x∈U( jˆ ,x′) p jˆ,x by (22). By the selection
of x′, we have the following set relation: U( j, xˆ) \ {x : p jˆ,x = 0} ⊆ U( jˆ,x′). Therefore we can deduce
that
tˆ = ∑
x∈U( j ,xˆ)\{x:p jˆ,x=0}
p jˆ,x ≤ ∑
x∈U( jˆ ,x′)
p jˆ,x = t
′.
This implies tˆ ≤ t ′ ≤ t, a contradiction. uunionsq
A.4 Full Proof of (⇒) part in Theorem 5
Proof (⇒) Let R be an arbitrary preference profile, and let P be an arbitrary assignment satisfying no-
generalized-cycle w.r.t. R. For convenience, we define some quantities to represent the state during the execu-
tion of a member of the family of eating algorithms at each round s. For ease of exposition, we use s= 0 to rep-
resent the initial state before the start of execution. Let M0 =M,D0 =D . Let Bs = {o∈Ms−1 : there are no x,
xˆ∈D s−1 s.t. o∈ xˆ and (x, xˆ)∈ Imp(P)}, Ms =Ms−1−Bs andD s = {x∈D : for every o∈ x,o∈Ms} be the
available bundles in Ms. We note that for any Ms−1 6= /0, Bs 6= /0. Otherwise, for any o ∈Ms−1, there exists
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x, xˆ ∈D s−1 s.t. o ∈ xˆ and (x, xˆ) ∈ Imp(P) which implies Imp(P) admits a generalized cycle, a contradiction.
Hence, Ms = /0 for some s ≤ np. Let S = min{s : Ms = /0}. Let ω j(t) be the eating rate of agent j at time t,
N(x,D s) be the set of agents who prefer x best in the available bundles D s for any x ∈ D s. The following
eating speed functions ω j define the algorithm:
∀s≤ S, s−1
S
≤ t ≤ s
S
,ω j(t)
def
=
{
S× p j,x, ∃o ∈ x,o ∈ Bs and j ∈ N(x,D s−1)
0, otherwise.
From the design of algorithm, we know that items in Bs decide which bundles inD s−1 are consumed in round
s, and these items are not consumed after the round s. Note that j ∈ N(x,D s−1) implies x ∈D s−1. We claim
that the algorithm specified by the eating speed functions ω = (ω j) j≤n above, outputs P for the MTRA with
preference profile R. Let Q be the output of the eating algorithm. We prove P = Q with induction.
Base case. For any o ∈ B1, x ∈D s.t. o ∈ x, we prove ∀ j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x. For any o ∈ B1, suppose
∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
p j,x < ∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1.
Then, there exists x, xˆ ∈ D0 and jˆ ∈ N(x,D0) such that x  jˆ xˆ, o ∈ xˆ and p jˆ,xˆ > 0, which implies that o is
not in B1, a contradiction. Hence, we have
∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
p j,x = ∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1.
That implies for any o ∈ B1, x ∈D0 s.t. o ∈ x, if j is not in N(x,D0), then p j,x = 0.
Then for any o ∈ B1, x ∈ D0 s.t. o ∈ x and j ∈ N(x,D0), we prove that agent j consumes exactly p j,x
units of bundle x. We know that x is available in 0≤ t ≤ 1S and agent j consumes x in 0≤ t ≤ 1S . Therefore,
q j,x ≥ 1S ×S× p j,x = p j,x. Hence,
∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
q j,x ≥ ∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
p j,x = 1.
Since,
∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
q j,x ≤ ∑
o∈x,x∈D
∑
j∈N
q j,x = 1,
we have
∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
q j,x = ∑
o∈x,x∈D0
∑
j∈N(x,D0)
p j,x = 1.
That implies for any o ∈ B1, x ∈ D0 s.t. o ∈ x, (i) if j ∈ N(x,D0), p j,x = q j,x; (ii) if j is not in N(x,D0),
q j,x = 0. Therefore, for any o ∈ B1, x ∈D s.t. o ∈ x and any j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x.
Inductive step. Assume for any o ∈⋃sk=1 Bk , x ∈D s.t. o ∈ x and any j ∈ N,
p j,x = q j,x. (24)
We prove for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈D s.t. o ∈ x and any j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x. If x is not in D s, there is oˆ ∈⋃sk=1 Bk
such that oˆ ∈ x and we have p j,x = q j,x by assumption (24). For any o ∈ Bs+1, suppose
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
p j,x + ∑
o∈x,x not in Ds
∑
j∈N
p j,x < ∑
o∈x,x∈D
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1.
Then, there exists x, xˆ ∈D s and jˆ ∈ N(x,D s) such that x jˆ xˆ, o ∈ xˆ and p jˆ,xˆ > 0, which implies that o is not
in Bs+1, a contradiction. Hence, we have
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
p j,x + ∑
o∈x,x not in Ds
∑
j∈N
p j,x = ∑
o∈x,x∈D
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1.
That implies for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈D s s.t. o ∈ x, if j is not in N(x,D s), then p j,x = 0.
For any o∈ Bs+1, x∈D s s.t. o∈ x and j ∈N(x,D s), we prove that agent j consumes exactly p j,x units of
bundle x. By the assumption (24), for any oˆ ∈Ms, oˆ remains ∑oˆ∈xˆ,xˆ∈Ds ∑ j∈N(xˆ,Ds) p j,x at least at time t = sS .
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Hence, x is available in sS ≤ t ≤ s+1S and agent j consumes x in sS ≤ t ≤ s+1S . Therefore, q j,x ≥ 1S ×S× p j,x =
p j,x. Hence,
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
q j,x + ∑
o∈x,x not in Ds
∑
j∈N
q j,x ≥
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
p j,x + ∑
o∈x,x not in Ds
∑
j∈N
p j,x = 1.
Since,
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
q j,x + ∑
o∈x,x not in Ds
∑
j∈N
q j,x ≤ ∑
o∈x,x∈D
∑
j∈N
q j,x = 1,
we have
∑
o∈x,x∈Ds
∑
j∈N(x,Ds)
q j,x + ∑
o∈x,x not in Ds
∑
j∈N
q j,x = 1,
That implies for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈ D s s.t. o ∈ x, (i) if j ∈ N(x,D s), p j,x = q j,x; (ii) if j is not in N(x,D s),
q j,x = 0. Therefore, for any o ∈ Bs+1, x ∈D s s.t. o ∈ x and any j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x.
By induction, we have for any o ∈ ⋃Sk=1 Bk , x ∈ D s.t. o ∈ x and any j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x. That is to say,
for any x ∈D and j ∈ N, p j,x = q j,x. uunionsq
A.5 Proof of Claim 1 in Theorem 6
Proof We know that each agent does the following things repeatedly in PS: consuming her most preferred
and unexhausted item till it is exhausted. To prove the claim, we show that agents in MPS executes the
same in each type as they does in PS, i.e. for any i ≤ p, j ≤ n, agent j still consumes her most preferred
and unexhausted item in type i while consuming her most preferred and available bundle. In the following
discussion, we use (oˆ,x\o) to denote the bundle replacing o with oˆ in x.
W.l.o.g. we discuss the behavior of agent j in MPS for type i. At the beginning of MPS, the bundle
consumed by agent j, denoted by x1, is her most preferred bundle regarding  j . By Definition 9, the most
preferred bundle contains agent j’s most preferred item in type i regarding ij . That means when agent j
consumes x1, she also consumes her most preferred item o1 = Di(x1). When the consumption of x1 pauses,
agent j turns to the bundle consumed after x1, denoted by x2. We note that x2 does not need to be the second
preferred regarding  j . There are two kinds of cases before consuming x2: (i) Di0 (x1) is exhausted, i0 6= i,
(ii) o1 is exhausted.
We claim that Di(x2) is the most preferred and unexhausted item in type i just after x1 is unavailable. For
Case (i), the agent j’s most preferred item in type i is still o1. We claim that o1 ∈ x2. Otherwise, suppose that
o2 =Di(x2) 6= o1. Then o1 ij o2. Because Di0 ((o1,x2\o2)) =Di0 (x2) for i0 B j i and o1 =Di((o1,x\o2))ij
Di(x2) = o2, it follows that (o1,x2\o2) j x2, which is a contradiction to the fact that x2 is the next preferred
bundle for agent j. For Case (ii), let M1 be the set of unexhausted items just after x1 is unavailable in MPS,
and o2 ∈M1⋂Di be agent j’s most preferred and unexhausted item in Di regarding ij . We also note that o2
does not need to be the second preferred item regarding ij . By Algorithm 2, we know that o2 = Di(x2), and
we can obtain that x2  j (o′2,x2\o2) if o′2 ∈M1
⋂
Di and o′2 6= o2.
The claim in the previous paragraph can be applied to the general case when xk is unavailable and turns
to xk+1, and we have that Di(xk+1) is always the most preferred and unexhausted item in type i just after xk
is unavailable. We note again that xk does not need to be the kth preferred regarding  j , and xk+1 only refers
to the bundle consumed after xk . From the result of proof, we can observe that agent j consumes the bundle
containing the most preferred and unexhausted item in type i. That is exactly what agent j does in PS of type
i. This result can be extended to any agent and any type. Thus each single type fractional assignment of P is
the same as the one produced by PS of that type.
A.6 Proof of Claim 2 in Theorem 6
Proof When iˆ≤ i′ = 1 i.e. P1j = Q1j , the claim means for S1 = {(o1∗)|o1 ∈U(1j , oˆ1)},
∑
x∈S1
p j,x = ∑
o∈U(1j ,oˆ1)
p1j,o = ∑
o∈U(1j ,oˆ1)
q1j,o = ∑
x∈S1
q j,x,
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which is trivially true.
Given Piˆ = Qiˆ for iˆ≤ i′ and the claim is true for iˆ≤ i′−1, which also means
∑
x∈{(oˆ1 ,...,oˆiˆ−1 ,oiˆ∗)|oiˆiˆj oˆiˆ}
p j,x = ∑
x∈{(oˆ1 ,...,oˆiˆ−1 ,oiˆ∗)|oiˆiˆj oˆiˆ}
q j,x, (25)
we prove that it is also true for i′. Let xˆ denote the least preferred bundle containing oˆ1, . . . , oˆi′ . Since Piˆj =Q
iˆ
j
for iˆ ≤ i′, we have that ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x ≥ ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) q j,x. minoˆi∈x,i≤i′ ∑o∈U(ij ,oˆi) p
i
o That is because agent j
consumes bundles in the set U( j, xˆ) until they are unavailable in P, and therefore she is unable to get more
on this set given the same shares of items. Because Q sdj P, we have ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x = ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) q j,x. We
also have that ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) p j,x = ∑x∈U( j ,xˆ) q j,x, which is equal to
∑
x∈{(o1∗)|o11j oˆ1}
p j,x + ∑
x∈{(oˆ1 ,o2∗)|o22j oˆ2}
p j,x + · · ·+ ∑
x∈{(oˆ1 ,oˆ2 ,oi−1∗)|oi−1i−1j oˆi−1}
q j,x + ∑
x∈Si′
p j,x
= ∑
x∈{(o1∗)|o11j oˆ1}
q j,x + ∑
x∈{(oˆ1 ,o2∗)|o22j oˆ2}
q j,x + · · ·+ ∑
x∈{(oˆ1 ,oˆ2,oi−1∗)|oi−1i−1j oˆi−1}
q j,x + ∑
x∈Si′
q j,x.
(26)
Here Si′ = {(oˆ1, . . . , oˆi′−1oi′∗)|oi′ ∈U(i′j , oˆi′ )}. Therefore by subtracting (25) for all iˆ < i′ from (26) we
have that ∑x∈Si′ p j,x = ∑x∈Si′ q j,x. uunionsq
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